Religious Freedom Under Our Constitution by Hoff, William Bruce
Volume 31 Issue 1 Article 3 
December 1924 
Religious Freedom Under Our Constitution 
William Bruce Hoff 
Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the First Amendment Commons 
Recommended Citation 
William B. Hoff, Religious Freedom Under Our Constitution, 31 W. Va. L. Rev. (1924). 
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol31/iss1/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research Repository @ 
WVU. It has been accepted for inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized editor of The Research 
Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu. 
WEST YIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM UNDER OUR CONSTITUTIONS*
By WLLIAM BRUCE HoF **
Blackstone, speaking of the laws of England, has very well said,
"The objects of the laws of England are so very numerous and
extensive that in order to consider them with any tolerable ease
and perspicuity, it will be necessary to distribute them under
proper and distinct heads; avoiding as much as possible divisions
too large and comprehensive on the one hand and too trifling and
minute on the other; both of which are equally productive of con-
fusion."' So it is with a discussion or investigation of the
existence, nature and extent of religious freedom under our consti
tutions. And, in emulation of the great English commentator, it
is our purpose to preface this discussion by placing limitations
on its scope which will tend to confine it with certain defined limits
and by outlining as briefly, yet as logically, as possible the propo-
sitions to be considered and discussed.
We shall assume for the purposes of this investigation that the
expression, "Our Constitutions," which might very well be taken
to comprehend either of two things, first, the Federal Constitution
and the Constitution of West Virginia, or second, the Federal Con-
stitution and the constitutions of the several states, is used in the
former or narrower sense. In view of this assumption, no attempt
will be made to examine exhaustively the constitutions of the other
states or to lay down authoritatively the law of the other states
with respect to the question of religious freedom. Such references
as shall be made to the constitutional provisions of other states
will be made solely for purposes of comparison or contrast with
provisions of our own state constitution in regard to similar ques-
tions. In the same manner, when references are made to the
* The James F. Brown Prize Thesis, 1923-24. In 1919 the late James F. Brown,
of the class of 1873, gave $5,000.00 to the University to be invested by it and the
income used as a prize for the best essay each year on the subject of the individual
liberties of the citizen as guaranteed by our constitutions. Any senior or any grad-
uate of any College of the University, within one year after receiving his bachelor's
degree, may compete for this prize.
** LL. B, West Virginia University, 1924, Parkersburg, West Virginia.
1 BLACKSTONi-S CoMMENTARIEs, 121.
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BELIGIOUB FBEEDOM
decisions of other states, it will be for the purpose of showing what
the possibilities and probabilities are in the event that similar cir-
cumstances and eases should arise in West Virginia and come
before our own state courts for adjudication.
The first inquiry, upon the determination of which in the affirma-
tive all further inquiry is predicated, is as to the existence of
religious freedom. Then, assuming that this be determined affirma-
tively, the natural and logical inquiry would be as to the extent
of this freedom, and as to the specific privileges and immunities
which evidence its existence, and further, if it be the result of
constitutional guaranties, then, as to the specific constitutional
provisions which expressly or by necessary implication give or
secure these privileges to the individual. The third and final
inquiry is as to the nature of this freedom, whether it is absolute
and unqualified, and if it be not absolute and unqualified but be
limited and restricted, then, in what manner and to what extent is
it so limited and restricted.
Undoubtedly a discussion of the problems raised by the last
inquiry will attract a more nearly universal and a more intense
interest than either or both of the first two, because it is matter of
common knowledge that civilized peoples devote far more time
to laitenting and deploring the restrictions and limitations placed
upon their conduct than they do thanking Divine Providence for
the privileges and immunities that they have. The writer must
not be understood as condemning this as a vicious trait. On the
contrary, it is his opinion that much, if not all, the progress of
civilization and every reform worthy of note is directly attributable
to this inherent dissatisfaction of man with his present state or con-
dition, however ideal it may be.
If we have religious freedom in West Virginia, it may be created,
secured or guaranteed by either the Federal Constitution, or by the
Constitution of the State of West Virginia, or by both. Every
citizen of every state is also a citizen of the United States,2 and is
thus at the same time the subject of two separate and distinct sover-
eignties and may be the recipient of the same or different privileges
and immunities from the fundamental laws of each, at the same
time.3
Due to this anomalous situation, created by these dual sover-
2 Claflin v. HOuseman, 93 U. S. 130, 136. The United States is not a foreign sov-
ereignty as regards the several states, but is a concurrent and, within its jurisdiction,
paramount sovereignty. Every citizen of a state is a subject of two distinct sovereign-
ties, having concurrent jurisdiction in the state.
a See Claflin v. Houseman, supra, at 136. The laws of the United States are laws
in the several states and just as much binding on the citizens and courts thereof as
the state laws are.
2
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eignties, it is possible for religious freedom to be guaranteed by one
in so far as legislative encroachment byits legislative department is
concerned, and yet at the same time for the individual to be as
completely shackled by the constitution and laws of the other as if
neither had guaranteed, or purported to guarantee, religious
liberty.'
As a matter of fact, the constitution proper of the United States
is with one comparatively insignificant exception silent on this
question. Its only provision in any way bearing on this question
is the one which provides that, "No religious test shall ever be
required as a qualification to any office or public trust under the
United States! While this is of itself a guaranty of a valuable
privilege and is an evidence of a commendable broad-mindedness
on the part of the framers of our constitution, it cannot be said
to create any appreciable degree of religious freedom, because it is
expressly limited and purports only to extend to seekers of political
offices and emoluments under the United States.' It would not
nor does it purport to place any restriction on the action of any
or all of the several states should they see fit, in the exercise of
an uncontrolled discretion, to require a religious test as a qualifica-
tion for an office or public trust under them."
The next and only further provision of the Federal Constitution
pertaining to religion is contained in the appendage to the Con-
stitution, commonly known and referred to as the "Bill of Rights."
It provides as follows: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.'8
This read in conjunction with the provisions contained in the
Constitution proper is a plain indication and expression of the
determination of the American people to preserve and perpetuate
religious liberty and to guard against the slightest approach toward
the establishment of a political and civil inequality which would
have for its basis only the differences in religious belief of the
people. The explanation for these provisions, which are conceded
to have been a great factor in our national development, lies, not
4 See Claflin v. Houseman, supra.
3 U. S. CONSTIsUTrio, AnT. VI.
, The language of this provision makes a clear case for the application of the
legal maxim. "pressio unius eat exclusio aiterve,. and hence limits it to offices and
trusts under the United States. The complete clause is as follows: "The senators
and representatives before mentioned, and the members of the several state legisla-
tures, and all executive and Judicial officers, both of the United States and of the sov-
Oral states, shall be bound by oath or affirmation, to support this constitution: but
no religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or public trust
under the United States." Thus, by the failure to expressly include state officials In
those who were to be exempt from religious tests In the same manner as they were
included in the part requiring an oath to support the Federal Constitution. there was
a disclaimer of an Inclusion by Implication of state officials in such exemption.
T See ante, Note 6.
9 See FMST AMNDMMNT To THE U. S. CoxSTmu'Trog.
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so much as some historians would have us believe in the supposed
fact that the framers of our fundamental laws were a group of
inspired super-men, but rests largely on the peculiar facts and
circumstances which surrounded the framing and adoption of these
laws. That the authors of the Federal Constitution came to their
task after centuries of religious oppression and persecution, some-
times by one party or sect, and sometimes by another, had taught
them the utter futility of all attempts to propagate religious
opinions and beliefs by the rewards, penalties and terrors of human
laws. So whatever may have been their individual sentiments or
opinions as to the propriety of the state assuming supervision
and control of religious opinions under other circumstances, the
general voice has been to make persons of all religious beliefs equal
before the law and to leave matters of religion to be settled by each
individual man and his Maker."
As has been said, these are the solitary provisions in the Federal
Constitution in any way relating to or guaranteeing religious
freedom. They are not, however, to be quarrelled with on the
grounds that they are few in number- or that their language is too
brief and concise. Despite this, they are nevertheless adequate
for the purposes which they purport to serve. The first of these
two provisions has been examined as to its meaning and scope
and found to be clear and unambiguous; the second, while it does
perform the purpose of restraining Congress from interfering
with religious freedom, is and purports to be only a limitation
upon the power of Congress.' 0 This provision does not operate
as a limitation upon the powers of the states for the obvious reason
that it is by its express terms a prohibition upon the power of
Congress only.'1 Since this is true, and we deem it to be too well
established to require further argument or citation of authority,
the State of West Virginia could have, when framing and adopting
its Constitution, effected as complete a union between the Church
and State as if the Federal Constitution had been silent on matters
of religion. So, it is further apparent that in the absence of an
express provision in the Constitution of the State of West Virginia,
which is a restraining rather than an enabling instrument, the
0 C00LEY'S CONSTITUTIONAL IMITATIONS, (6th Ed.), 571.
10 Permoli v. City of New Orleans, 3 How. 589, 609 (U. S. 1845). The Constitu-
tion makes no provision for protecting the citizens of the respective states in their re-
ligious liberties. This is left to the state constitutons and laws. Nor is there any in-
hibition imposed by the Constitution of the United States in this respect on the states.
See also Brunswick-Balke Callander Co. '. Evans. 228 Fed. 998.
2 See Permoli . City of New Orleans, supra. See also People 'V. Board of Educa-
tion, 245 Ill., 33, 338, 92 N. E. 252, 258, holding that the First Amendment of the
United States Constitution left the states free to enact such statutes as they deem
proper in respect to religion.
See ante, Note 6.
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legislature of the State of West Virginia would have had the power
to legislate in such a manner as to effectually divest the individual
of every vestige of religious liberty.' In such a case, it would have
been small consolation to the individual to point out to him that
in his capacity as a citizen of the other sovereignty he was guaran-
teed absolute immunity against all governmental interference in
matters of religion.
Whatever may have been the motives or purposes actuating the
framers of our constitution, and whether or not they inserted the
provisions with a consciousness of the fact that the task was only
half performed by the Federal Constitution, is a matter of small
consequence from the purely legal viewpoint. But certain it is that
the Constitution of West Virginia contains provisions relating to
and guaranteeing religious freedom, which for sweeping all-inclu-
siveness and detailed thoroughness it would be difficult, if not
impossible, to find a parallel in any written constitution.
Possibly the best illustration of this is the section of our con-
stitution, which provides:
"No man shall be compelled to frequent or support any
religious worship, place of ministry whatsoever; nor shall any
man be enforced, restrained, molested or burthened, in his body
or goods, or otherwise suffer, on account of his religious opinions
or belief, but all men shall be free to profess and by argument,
to maintain their opinions in matters of religion; and the same
shall, in no wise, affect, diminish or enlarge their civil capacities;
and the legislature shall not prescribe any religious tests what-
ever, or confer any peculiar privileges or advantages on any
sect or denomination, or pass any laws requiring or authorizing
any religious society, or the people of any district within this
state, to levy on themselves, or others, any tax for the erection
or repair of any house for public worship, or for the support
of any church or ministry, but it shall be left free for every
person to "select his religious instructor, and to make for his
support, such private contract as he shall please." 13
A close rival to the section just quoted as to the comprehensive-
ness of its scope, and of particular significance because the privi-
12 See Permoli v. City of New Orleans, supra. See also People v. Board of Educa-
tion, supra.
See State ex rel Thompson, et a?, v. McAllister, et al, 38 W. Va. 485, .8 S. 1). 770,
holding that there is an important distinction between the construction of state and
federal constitutions. The Constitution of the United States is a source and grant
of power to the Congress of the United States. It is an enabling ahd not a restrain-
ing instrument, and Congress can do nothing except what the constitution either dl-
reety or by reasonable construction authorizes it to do. On the other hand, the con-
stitutions of the states are restraining instruments and the legislatures of the states
possess all legislative power not prohibited to them by their constitutions. See also In
this connection, Brown v. Etts, 91 va. 726, 734, 21 S. D. 119, 121.22 W. VA. CONeTITUTION, ART. III, §15.
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leges guaranteed by it are expressly named and designated, which
fact presents an almost insurmountable barrier to judicial con-
struction which might otherwise vitiate them, is the one which
provides that, "no religious or political test oath shall be required
as a pre-requisite or qualification to vote, serve as a juror, sue,
plead, appeal, or pursue any profession or employment. "14
These two provisions, while they are not the only ones in our
constitution bearing on the question of religion, are for present
purposes sufficient.' There is sufficient unambiguous and un-
equivocal language used to establish a prohibition upon the state
legislature similar to that imposed by the Federal Constitution
upon Congress. Since we have found that the legislative branches
of both sovereignties, which by possibility might legislate for the
individual, are restrained from doing so by their fundamental
laws, we are forced to conclude that we do have religious freedom
in West Virginia and that, "No external authority is to place itself
between the finite being and the Infinite when the former is seeking
to render the homage that is due and in a mode which commends
itself to his conscience and judgment as beng suitable for him to
render and acceptable to its object."' 6
This brings us to the consideration of the extent of our religious
freedom, and to a consideration of the specific privileges which
evidence its existence, and a more minute consideration of the
specific constitutional provisions from which such privileges are
derived. It would be pertinent here to insert a definition of
religious freedom, if such were available. But, as Mr. Justice
Holmes, one of our greatest living jurists, has put it, "Definition
is the most difficult of all things, both in the law and elsewhere.'1 7
So religious freedom is one of the conceptions in our law which
defies successful or satisfactory definition. 8 In lieu of a definition
of the whole phrase we propose to submit a definition of the word
"religion," leaving the word "freedom" undefined, it being of
16 W. VA. CONsTITUTION, ART. III, §11.
25 See W. VA. CONsTIrTUTION, ART. VI, § 47, which provides: "No charter of encor-
poration shall be granted to any church or religious denomination. Provisions may be
made by general laws for securing the title to church property and for the sale and
transfer thereof so that it shall be held, used or transferred for the purposes of such
church or religious denomination."
See also w. VA. CONsTrrUTION, ART. X, §1, providing that property used for reli-
gious purposes may be exempted from taxation. The first of these two provisions
obviously has nothing to do with this discussion. The second will be considered In
another connection.
2 COOLEY'S CONSTITUTIONAL LTATIONS, (6th Ed.), 576.
17 Compare languages of Charles R. Hough speaking of definition in an article en-
titled "Due Process of Law-Today" in 32 HARv. LAw REv. 218.
"s But see Davis v. Beason, 133 U. S. 333, 342, where Mr. Justice Field attempts
Judicial definition of religion. He says: "Religion has reference to one's views of
his relation to his creator and to the obligations which they impose of his reverence
for his being and character, and of obedience to his will. It is often confounded with
the cultus or form of worship of a particular sect, but is distinguishable from the
latter."
6
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such convenient vagueness as to produce but slight difference of
opinion as to its meaning. Religion has been defined by the lexi-
cographer as "The outward act or form by which men indicate
their recognition of a God, or of Gods, having power over their
destiny, to whom obedience, service and honor are due; the feeling
or expression of human love, fear or awe of some superhuman and
over-ruling power." According to this definition of religion,
religious freedom would be the liberty to perform these acts and
entertain these feelings and beliefs unrestricted and unmolested by
governmental interference.
A careful inspection of the above definition will divulge that by
possibility all that might be understood to be included is not in
fact included in the definition. As defined, we understand the
term "religious freedom" to merely include the freedom to act
affirmatively in pursuance of some religious belief, or to believe
affirmatively in some religious doctrine. It is quite conceivable
that a broader construction might be placed on the term. Some
might reasonably believe it to include not only what has been
stated, but also the freedom to passively disbelieve in all religion
or to act affirmatively in pursuance of such disbelief in all religious
doctrine and creeds. Perhaps the point may best be illustrated by
stating it in the form of a question. Quaere: Do our constitutional
guaranties of religious freedom presuppose the adherence of all
men to some religious faith or belief, or do they presuppose nothing,
but mean to give and guarantee religious freedom in the broad
sense that would include the freedom to be anti-religious, without
religion, and to deny the existence of a super-human and over-
ruling power? This question is raised in connection with the
definition of religious freedom, but will not be commented on here,
it being discussed in some detail in another connection.
Mr. Justice Miller has stated perhaps as well and as concisely
as anyone has or will the extent of religious freedom guaranteed
by our Federal Constitution. He has said, "In this country the
full and free right to entertain any religious belief, to practice any
religious principle and to teach any religious doctrine, which does
not violate the laws of morality and property, and which does not
infringe personal rights, is conceded to all. The law knows no
heresy and is committed to the support of no dogma, the establish-
ment of no sect."' 9  Scott, Justice, in a Virginia case, speaking
of the Constitution and laws of Virginia, which make substanti-
ally if not identically the same provisions as ours regarding rell-
9 See Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall, 679, 728. (U. S. 1871).
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gious freedom, said, "Proclaiming to all our citizens that hence-
forth their religious thoughts and conversations shall be as free as
the air they breathe; that the law is of no sect in religion; has no
high priest but justice, declaring to the Christian and the Nohame-
tan, the Jew and the Gentile, the Epicurean and the Platonist, that
so long as they keep within its pale all are equally objects of its
protection." 20 So long as religion is a matter of the conscience the
civil power must not invade it, but when religious conscience
violates the rights of others and culminates in acts which tend
toward the subversion of civil government, it must be restrained
within its own domain and excluded from the civil realm which
it might otherwise control.21 Our constitutions do not mean to
extend religious freedom to matters of a purely secular nature, no
matter how conscientiously such matters are believed to be religions
in their character.2  In general we may say that the religious
freedom guaranteed by our constitutions is of the mind and con-
science, rather than of human actions. The things just discussed
obviously overlap somewhat on another question, as to which they
have more particular significance. They are gone into here solely
for the purpose of having them throw what light they will on the
extent of our religious freedom and will be discussed again in
connection with the question already stated and given more
detailed consideration.
Cooley, in his valuable work on the American Constitutions, 2
has classified the things which are not lawful under them.' The
classification is particularly accurate as applied to the Federal
Obstitution and the West Virginia Constitution. So it will be
adopted and followed, subject to necessary revision and elabora-
tion, in so far as possible, because it offers, what is to our view, the
most logical method of considering the specific religious privileges
and immunities of the citizen of West Virginia. His classification
is as follows:
1. Any law respecting an establishment of religion would be
unconstitutional. The legislative branches of our governments
have not been left free to effect a union between the Church and
State, or to establish preferences by law in favor of any one reli-
gious persuasion or mode of worship. Due to the great dearth of
Federal decisions and the entire absence of adjudications by the
0 Perry v. Comonwealth, 3 Gratt, 632, 642. (va. 1846). Case holds that an
atheist is not incapacitated from being a witness. But see contra, Thurston v. Whit-
ney, et al, 56 Mass. 104.
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145.
Commonwealth v. Herr, 229 Pa. St. 132, 78 AtI. 68.
2 COO.,T'S CONSTITUTIONAL LnIITATIONS.
" COOLEYS CONSTIUTIONAL LMATIONS, (6th Ed.), pp. 575 to 577. inclusive.
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Supreme Court of West Virginia pertaining to this question, the
author deems it necessary to state paranthetically that in the great
variety of instances we shall have to content ourselves with a ref-
erence to the constitutional provisions themselves. They are, how-
ever, in most cases too clear to admit of judicial construction which
would vitiate their plain and patent meaning. So, as to this guar-
anty, we can only refer, first, to the "Bill of Rights" of the Federal
Constitution, which provides that, "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion,"2 and, second, to the
provision of our State Constitution previously quoted, which says
that, "No man shall be compelled to frequent or support any
religious worship or place of ministry whatsoever, "I and the
further language of the same section which provides that the legis-
lature shall not "confer any peculiar privileges or advantages on
any sect or denomination."
In elaborating the point under discussion it would be difficult
to improve on the language of our own constitution. The consti-
tution, after speaking of matters of religion, says, "And the same
shall in no wise affect, diminish or enlarge their civil capacities.' '27
And in enumerating some of the civil capacities which are referred
to, we can with impunity again follow the language of the constitu-
tion, which is that, "No religious or political test oath shall be
required as a pre-requisite to vote, serve as a juror, sue, plead,
appeal or pursue any profession or employment.' '2 It is to be
observed that our State Constitution, unlike the Federal Consti-
tution, does not specifically provide that, "No religious test shall
ever be required as a qualification to any office or public trust,"29
but on this point merely says that no religious test oath shall be
required as a prerequisite to "pursue any professional or employ-
ment."' Quaere: Does it remain possible for our legislature to
prescribe a religious test as a requirement to office holding in West
Virginia? While the clause referred to is silent on the point, it
would seem that this question must of necessity be decided in the
negative. The provision that matters of religion shall "in no wise
affect, diminish or enlarge their civil capacities," while it does not
particularize, would we think by necessary implication prohibit
legislative prescription of a religious test or oath as a prerequisite
to office. Another clause in the same section, which provides that
M IEST A NDmENT, U. S. CONSTITUTION.
"W. VA CONSTITUTION, Art. 11, §15.
"I W. VA. CONSTITUTION, Art, III, §15.
W. VA. CONSTLTuTION, Art III, §11.
See U. s. CoNsmTTUTIoN, Art. VI.
W. VA. CoNsTormoH, Art. III, §11.
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the legislature "shall not prescribe any religious test whatever,"13
is in like manner open to the objection that it does not particu-
larize, but its language would seem to be broad enough to control
the situation.
As to the wisdom of the separation of Church and State and the
full and free participation by all irrespective of religious belief in
governmental, civil and temporal affairs, Madison is credited with
saying: "Religion is not within the purview of human govern-
ment," and that "Religion is essentially distinct from human
government and exempt from its cognizance. A connection be-
tween them is injurious to both. There are causes within the
human breast which insure the perpetuity of religion without the
aid of law." Washington, however, advocated a somewhat dif-
ferent view. He said: "Whatever may be conceded to the influence
of refined education on minds of peculiar structure, reason and
experience both forbid us to expect that national morality can
prevail in exclusion of religious principles." 32  We believe that
Welch, Justice, in an Ohio case,3 3 strikes the keynote of the situ-
ation when he says: "A form of religion that cannot live under
equal and impartial laws ought to die, and sooner or later must
die.'"'" And later, in the same case, he says: "True religion is
the sun which gives to government all its true lights, while the
latter merely acts upon religion by reflection." 35 We may quote
the same man further as saying, that, "Religion is the parent, not
the offspring, of good government." In view of the statements
just quoted, to which we will add that of Jefferson, in which he
said: "That to suffer the civil magistrate to intrude his powers
into the field of opinion and to restrain the profession or propaga-
tion of principles on the supposition of their supposed ill tendency,
is a dangerous fallacy, which at once destroys all religious lib-
erty,"3 7 we are not ashamed to adopt the view that this guaranty
of our constitution is particularly commendable. We do not adopt
this view solely because of the great men in the past who advocated
it, but because reason and experience recommend it, our first Chief
executive to the contrary notwithstanding.33
It is obvious that no attempt has been made to enumerate all
the civil privileges and immunities which are the outgrowth and
Idem.
See Washington's Farewell Address.
Board of Education v. Minor, et al, 23 Ohio St. 211.
Idem, at 247.
Idem, at 249.
es Idem.
37 See VA. CODE, 1904, §1394; Preamble to Act for Religious Freedom.
I See ante, Note 32.
10
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concomitants of the separation of the Church and State. Suffice
it to say that unless exceptions are discussed elsewhere, there are
no limitations on one's civil capacities which have for their basis
only his religious beliefs.
2. Compulsory support by taxation, or otherwise, of religious
instruction or worship would be unconstitutional. Our constitu-
tions make the support of religious instruction entirely voluntary
and remove the coercion of such support from the sphere of gov-
ernment. -While some states leave this matter in some doubt,"'
the language of the West Virginia Constitution is so clear and
unequivocal as to preclude all possibility of argument. It pro-
vides: "No man shall be compelled to frequent or support any
religious worship, place of ministry whatsoever." 40  And in the
same section it provides that the legislature shall not "pass any
law requiring or authorizing any religious society or the people
within any district of this state to levy on themselves or others
any tax for the erection of any house for public worship, or for the
support of any church, or ministry, but it shall be left free for
every person to select his religious instructor and to make for his
support such private contract as he shall please."14 1 The language
to which we attach particular significance in this connection is
that which provides that it shall be left free for every man to
select his religious instructor and to make for his support such
private contract as he shall please.
The connection in which the question of taxation for the support
of religious worship has been most frequently raised is that of
Bible reading in the public schools. In the great variety of
instances where this is done, those who desire may be excused
from participating in such reading, or even from remaining
present.42 It has been held that the mere reading of the Bible with-
out comment is not a violation of the constitution. 43 The present
tendency is toward exclusion of the Bible from the public schools.
The theory of this is not that reading the Bible in the public schools
molests anyone in the exercise and enjoyment of his constitutional
right of freedom of religious profession, worship and opinion, but
that Bible reading in the public schools molests the tax payer
without any regard to his religion, or want of religion, in the
exercise and enjoyment of his constitutional right of freedom from
30 See for typical case dincussing this question, Hale v. Everett, 53 N. H. 1.
' .VA. CONSTITUTIO, Art. III §15.
41 Idem.
42 Spiller v. Inhabitants of Woburn, 12 Allen 127 (Mass. 1866).
t Billard v. Board of Education, 69 Kan. 53, 76 Pac. 422. But see Board of Educa-
tion v. Minor, supra holding that Bible reading may be constitutionally prohibited In
public schools, with or without comment.
11
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taxation to help support any clergy or church establishment.44
While this question of taxation for the support of religious worship
is one which excites a great deal of interest and, which if discussed
with reference to all the American constitutions, would entail a
long and detailed dissertation, but confined to West Virginia and
considered from the strictly legal viewpoint, it presents no diffi-
culty. It is, of course, one of the most valuable guaranties that
our constitutions contain.
3. A requirement by legislation of attendance upon religious
worship would conflict with our constitutions. Our state consti-
tution expressly, provides, in the section quoted before, that, "No
man shall be compelled to frequent, or support, any religious
worship or place of ministry whatsoever." 45 While there might be
some disagreement as to the wisdom of such a privilege or immunity,
we submit that the obligations which spring from man's relation to
his Maker are to be enforced by the admonitions of conscience, and
not by the penalties of human laws.
4. It would be unconstitutional for the legislatures, subject to
such exceptions as shall be hereafter noted, to place any restraint
upon the free exercise of religion according to the dictates of the
conscience. The Federal Constitution, briefly but adequately guar-
antees this in the clause which prohibits any Congressional legisla-
tion restricting the free exercise of religion." The only provision
in the West Virginia Constitution directly conferring this privilege
is that which says: "All men shall be free to profess and by argu-
ment to maintain their opinions in matters of religion." 47 A further
provision which may be considered important for this purpose is
that which gives to the individual the right to select his own reli-
gious instructor and provide for his support.48 This guaranty,
while valuable, is, like the freedom from taxation, so well estab-
lished that a lengthy discussion is unnecessary.
5. Any law prohibiting the teaching of any religious principle
or restraining the propagation of religious doctrines would be
unconstitutional. This appears from the general language of the
Federal Constitution, hereinbefore quoted, and our state constitu-
tion expressly provides that, "All men shall be free to profess and
". People v. Board of Education, supra.
". VA. CONSTITUTION, Art. III, §15.
See FIRST AMENDMENT U. S. CONSTITUTION. But see as to propriety of state
Police regulations Commonwealth v. Plaistead, 148 Mass. 374, 19 N. E. 224.
W. VA. CONSTITUTION, Art. 11, §15.
UIdem.
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by argument to maintain their opinions in matters of religion' ""
An earnest believer usually regards it as his duty to propagate his
opinions and bring others to his views; and so, if it were not for
this guaranty, such believer would be deprived of what he regards
as a most sacred privilege.
We have arrived at the third, and final, inquiry, which is as
to the nature of religious freedom, whether it is unqualified and
absolute, and if it be not unqualified and absolute, then, in what
manner and to what extent is it limited and qualified. Since the
problems in the above inquiry overlap, more or less, perhaps the
best method of treating it will be to state the final conclusion as
to whether religious freedom is unqualified, and then proceed to a
consideration of the things which prove that conclusion.
Our conclusion is that the religious freedom granted to the peo-
ple of West Virginia is not absolute and unqualified, but is limited
and restricted. It has been contended in some cases that Christian-
ity is a part of the common law of this country; and further, that
when the word "religion" was used in our constitutions, the
"Christian religion" was meant. While this question has not been
raised in West Virginia, it has been raised in the Ohio courts, and
it has been held that under the Ohio Constitution, which is for
practical purposes the same as ours, neither Christianity nor any
other system of religion is a part of the law of that state.5 The
government has, however, and we think with propriety, taken
cognizance of the fact that the great majority of the people sub-
ject to its laws have some form of religion and that the Christian
religion, in its various phases, is the prevalent religious system of
this country.
Government has not only taken cognizance of this fact, but its
laws respecting morality and topics of a kindred nature are based
on the Christian conceptions of what is moral and immoral. Out
of this practice has grown up the limitations and restrictions on
religious freedom. The laws prohibiting polygamy and bigamy
in the states and territories of the United States are based on the
Christian conception of what is moral. It has been contended that
such laws are a violation of our constitutional guaranties of reli-
'o Idem. But see Davis v. Beaton supra, holding that the United States Congress
may constitutionally punish one for teaching and counselling one to follow a rell-
gious practice or doctrine which encourages the commission of acts made criminal by
the law of the land.
rO See Bloom v. Richards, 2 Ohio St. 387. See also Board of Education W. Minor,
supra, at 246, where the court says: "Legal Christianity is a solecism; a contradic-
tion of terms. When Christianity asks the aid of government beyond mere impartial
protection, it denies itself. Its essential interests lie beyond the reach and range of
human government.' But see State v. Chandler, 2 Harr. (Del. 1837) 553, in which
case the court vindicates what it calls the legal maxim that Christianity is a part of
the common law.
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gious freedom.5' These laws are a limitation and restriction on
religious freedom in the broad sense of its being absolute, but they
are not a violation of religious freedom within the meaning of our
constitutional guaranties thereof.5 2  Bigamy and polygamy are
prohibited constitutionally in order that the criminal laws may
be uniform, and in order to prohibit those things which are
regarded by common consent of the Christian world as properly
subjects of punitive legislation. 3 It was never intended by the
First Amendment to the Federal Constitution that religious belief
should be a protection against legislation for the punishment of
acts inimical to the peace, good order and morals of society. 4 Mr.
Justice Bradley, speaking of the validity of laws prohibiting polyg-
amy, said: "The pretense of religious belief cannot deprive Con-
gress of the power to prohibit polygamy and all other open offenses
against the enlightened sentiment of mankind.''" The United
States Supreme Court, when called on to pass upon the same ques-
tion in the famous case of Reynolds v. United States," held that
religious belief could not be accepted as a justification for an overt
act made criminal by the law of the land.5 7 Mr. Justice Field, in
a later case in the United States Supreme Court, involving the con-
stitutionality of an act of a territorial legislature of Idaho denying
civil privileges to people who practiced polygamy or belonged to
an order which encouraged it, said: "A crime is not the less odious
because it is sanctioned b what any particular sect may designate
as religion,"5 18 and that, "Few crimes are more pernicious to the
best interests of society and receive more general or deserved pun-
ishment. To extend exemption from punishment for such crimes
would be to shock the moral judgment of the community. To call
51 Reynolds v. United States, supra. See also Davis v. Beason, supra.
52 Reynolds v. United States, supra.
G Reynolds v. United States, supra, at 166, where the court says: in speaking of
the validity of a law prohibiting polygamy: "It is constitutional, and valid, as pres-
cribing a rule of action for all those residing in territories and places over which the
United States have exclusive control. This being so, the only question which remains
is, whether those who make polygamy a part of their religion are excepted from the
operation of the statute. If they are, then those who do not make polygamy a part of
their religious behalf may be found guilty and punished, while those who do must
be acquitted and go free. This would be Introducing a new element into criminal law.
Laws are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with
mere religious beliefs and opinions, they may with practices. Suppose one believed
that human sacrifices were a necessary part of religious worship, would It be ser-
iously contended that the civil government under which he lived could not interfere
to prevent a sacrifice Or if a wife religiously believed it was her duty to burn herself
upon the funeral pyre of her husband, would it be beyond the power of the civil
government to prevent her carrying her belief into practice?'
" See Davis v. Beason, supra. See also Knowles v. United States, 170 Fed. 412,
which holds that prohibiting the mailing of obscene mater is not a violation of the
constitutional provisions relating to religion. See also Clarke V. United States, 211
Fed. 918.
0 Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U. S. 150.
r4 98 U. S. 145.
5 Reynolds v. United States, supra.
5 Davis v. Beason, supra, at 345.
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their advocacy a tenet of religion is to offend the common sense of
mankind. If they are crimes, then to teach, advise and counsel
their practice is to aid in their commission, and such counselling
and teaching are themselves criminal and proper subjects of pun-
ishment as aiding and abetting crime in all other cases.'"'s He
goes further, and says: "However free the exercise of religion
may be it must be subordinate to the criminal laws of the country
passed with reference to actions regarded by general consent as
properly the subjects of punitive legislation."'
These lengthy quotations relating specifically to polygamy are
not inserted on the theory that laws prohibiting polygamy are in
themselves of sufficient importance to demand detailed consider-
ation. The object is to show that the conceptions of morals that
underlie our laws of this character are the Christian conceptions.
This can best be illustrated by reverting again to the language of
Justice Field, where he says:- "Probably never before in the his-
tory of this country has it been seriously contended that the whole
punitive power of the government for acts recognized by the gen-
eral consent of the Christian world in modern times as proper
matter for prohibitory legislation must be suspended in order that
the tenets of a religious sect encouraging crime may be carried
out without hindrance."'" So, the statement may be made and
defended that while we do have religious freedom, acts which
though they are the religious practices of some sect offend the moral
sense of the "Christian world" or violate the Christian conception
of what is right and wrong, may be prohibited and justified as a
valid exercise of the police power. It is in pursuance of this policy
to enforce the Christian code of morality that practically all our
laws for morality and decency are enacted.02 It will thus be per-
ceived that in so far as the Christian code of morals differs from
that of other sects, the adherents of such other sects are compelled
to pursue a line of conduct which they believe to be improper and
to refrain from doing the things which they conscientiously believe
they should do.
Profanity and blasphemy are prohibited by our laws and justi-
fied as a necessary police regulation to prevent a course of conduct
generally shocking to the sentiments of the people and in order to
preserve the public peace.8 3 The courts hold that blasphemy is
punished, not as a crime against God, but as a crime against man.0 4
59 Idem, at 341.
10 Idem, at 342.
1 Davis v. Beason, supra, at 343.
See BAnNEs' W. VA. CoDr, 1923, Ch. 149.
1 State v. Chandler, supra.
" Mm.
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Enforced observance of the Christian Sabbath could be justified as
a necessary police regulation in order to secure to the great ma-
jority of the members of the community the enjoyment of the
privileges of religious worship. It is not, however, so justified.
It is held to be a necessary police regulation for the purpose of
providing one day of rest in seven, which is considered by our
courts to be conducive to public health.65  The selection of the
Christian Sabbath as this day of rest is, of course, simply another
recognition of the desire of the adherents of the prevalent religious
system. This is quite obviously a restriction on the religious free-
dom of those who, if they practiced their religious belief, would not
observe the Christian Sabbath, since reasons of practical necessity
require their engaging in temporal pursuits on the day which they
would otherwise observe as a day for religious worship.6
It would be impossible to enumerate and discuss all the laws
which in some way or another encroach upon and restrict the
religious practices or some of the multitude of religious sects. An
illustration which will serve to indicate the things which the laws
of the states may constitutionally do is to punish one who fails
to furnish medical aid to one who needs such aid and who is legally
entitled to look to such party for medical aid. The party charged
with such failure cannot set up his religious belief as a defense
to a prosecution for such an offense.6' To summarize, we may say
that laws enforcing the police power of the state do not violate
religious freedom. Such laws may limit or restrict religious free-
dom in the broad sense, but in no fair sense of the word can they
be said to violate the constitutional guaranties thereof.8 s They were
made subject to the regulation of civil conduct conformably to some
code of morals. The enforcement of a code of morals does not
underlie all police regulations, but it does underlie those which
aim toward the general well being of the individual rather than
his physical health and safety. These are matters about which all
religious sects cannot be given absolute liberty. An attempt to do
so would produce no end of confusion and would ultimately tend
toward the subversion of all civil government. Law has been said
to be a practical matter, existing for practical ends. If this be true,
s Swann v. Swann, 21 Fed. 299.
0 See, for example, the practices of the Jews, who if left to follow their own im-pulses would observe Saturday as the day for religious worship.
6 Owens v. State, 116 Pac. 345, (Okla. 1911). See to the effect that religious
healing may be prohibited, Smith v. People, 51 Colo. 270, 117 Pac. 612. See State v.
Chenoweth, 163 Ind. 99, 71 N. E. 199, holding that belief in divine healing is no
defense to prosecution for manslaughter for failure to furnish medical aid. See also
6 VA. LAW REG. (NS) 651.
9 Swaun v. Swann, 8upra; Reynolds v. U. S. supra.
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and we assume that it is, it was necessary that our law makers
should adopt some moral code upon which to base our criminal
laws and police regulations. And since the Christian religion is the
prevalent religious system in this country it is quite fitting and
proper that the Christian code of morality has been consciously or
unconsciously adopted.
The question of what, if anything, our constitutional guaranties
of religious freedom presuppose is the only question which remains
unsettled. The point has been raised and the question stated earlier
in this discussion, but for practical purposes it will be re-stated
here. Quaere: Do our constitutional guaranties of religious free-
dom presuppose the adherence of all men to some religious faith
or belief, or do they presuppose nothing, but mean to give and
guarantee religious freedom in the broad sense that would include
the freedom to be anti-religious, without religion, and to deny the
existence of a super-human and over-ruling power ? It is import-
ant to observe that thus far the discussion has related specifically
to the privileges and immunities of religionists and the restrictions
placed upon their conduct. Nothing has been said which is neces-
sarily conclusive of this question. The purpose of the discussion
upon which this question has been incidentally raised and touched
on before was to show whether or not discriminations could be
made against one on account of his religious belief. The object of
this discussion is to see whether or not our constitutions permit a
discrimination against one on account of his lack of religious belief.
We have seen that in a limited sense we have religious freedom.
We now propose to see whether we have anti-religious or non-
religious freedom. We have already committed ourselves to the
view that these conceptions might reasonably be understood to be
included in a constitutional guaranty of religious freedom.
In determining this question it is important to note that the
problem is not whether laws have been made or enforced which
discriminate against the anti-religionist, but is whether laws could
be constitutionally made or enforced which would do so. A casual
examination of our constitutions would lead one to the opinion that
the anti-religionist and non-religionist are protected in the same
manner as the adherents to some religious faith or belief. But it is
doubtful whether this opinion would remain so firmly fixed after
a careful analysis of our constitutional provisions and an investiga-
I" Observe that as this section now stands without the qualifying language a party
is not by its express terms protected irrespective of his religious belief or lack of
religious belief. So, the rule of construction that the "expression of one thing is the
exclusion of another" might very well be applied here.
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tion of what is known as judicial construction. Suppose that by
this well established practice of "judicial reading in" explanatory
and qualifying language the word "particular" was read into
Article VI of the Federal Constitution. It would then read:
No particular religious test shall be required as a qualification
to any office or public trust under the United States.
In such a case, what would prevent legislation by Congress which
would keep the anti-religionist or non-religionist from holding
office under the United States?
Suppose, in like manner, the phrase "any particular" was read
into the First Amendment to the Federal Constitution. It would
then read:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
any particular religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.6 9
This would authorize Congressional legislation encouraging and
facilitating religious worship, subject only to the limitation that
no particular sect could be favored or given a preference over
another.
Applying this same theory to our State Constitution, the
Eleventh Section of the Third Article would by the insertion of the
word "particular" provide:
No particular religious or political test oath shall be required
as a pre-requisite or qualification to vote, serve as a juror, sue,
plead, appeal or pursue any profession or employment.
So read, this section would not prevent the state legislature
requiring as a prerequisite to the enjoyment of these privileges that
the party affiliate himself with some religious faith or another.
Section Fifteen of Article III, would after the insertion of the
word "particular" at proper intervals, read as follows:
No man shall be compelled to frequent or support any
particular religious worship or place of ministry whatsoever. Nor
shall any man be enforced, restrained, molested or burthened,
in his body or goods, or otherwise suffer, on account of his
particular religious opinions or belief, but all men shall be free
to profess and by argument to maintain their opinions in matters
of religion ;70 and the same shall, in no wise, affect, diminish or
70 Observe that this clause is probably not as broad in fact as it purports to be.
The atheist who attempted to propagate his opinions with the same fervency as the
religionist would likely be arrested for blasphemy or restrained as a nuisance. See
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enlarge their civil capacities; and the legislature shall not pre-
scribe any particular religious test whatever, or confer any
peculiar privileges or advantages on any particular sect or
denomination.
Such judicial construction would authorize taxation for the
support of religious worship generally. It would permit the law
to enforce, molest and restrain a man who was non-religious or
anti-religious. Such construction would not permit preferences of
sects or denominations over one another, but it would permit pref-
erences in favor of religionists over anti-religionists.71  Obviously
if these things, taxation specifically, were allowed, the atheist would
be denied freedom and immunity from discriminatory legislation.
It might be urged that this is a ridiculous situation which could
never arise. The purely obvious answer to such a contention is
that we are here discussing what it would be possible to do con-
stitutionally and not what is likely or probable. In support of the
probability of such a situation what we consider a tenable argument
can be advanced. While government has deemed it impossible or
impracticable to designate any one religious doctrine as the correct
one and attempt to propagate it and extirpate all others and
reward those who adhere to that doctrine and punish those who
do not, it might conceivably take cognizance of what we deem to be
a fact that religion in general and the incidents thereof are bene-
ficial to man. Government might take the view that the belief in
religion, with its attendant belief in eternal punishment and re-
ward, would tend to make a man a better public official or a better
subject upon which to confer civil privileges and immunities. In
pursuance of this view, it might require as a qualification to the
enjoyment of these civil privileges that all its citizens should affili-
ate themselves with some religious sect.
Withdrawing from the field of conjecture and considering actual
Bodenhamer v. State, 60 Ark. 10, 28 S. W. 507, which holds that crime need not bo
committed publicly. See also the extraordinary case of Commonwealth v. Kneeland,
37 Mass. 206, holding that no words of malediction, contumely or reproach need be
used in order to constitute the crime of blasphemy, but that mere denial with intent
to disparage God and destroy the reverence due Him is a blasphemy. See also State v.
Chandler, supra... See further in this general connection a note on "Legality of Athe-
Ism" in 31 HA. LAW. RlvisW. 289.
7 See to the effect that courts in construing legislation are not to presume an un-
friendly attitude toward religion generally, Church of the Holy Trinity V. United
States, 143 U. S. 457. This case holds that the Act of Congress of 1885 "To prohibit
the importation and migration of foreigners and aliens under a contract or agreement
to perform labor in the United States or Territories" does not apply to a contract be-
tween an alien residing out of the United States and a religious society incorporated
under the laws of a state, whereby he engages to remove to the United States and
enter into the service of the Society as its rector or minister. The Court says at 472,
"The general language thus employed Is broad enough to reach cases and acts which
the whole history and life of the country show could not have been intentionally leg-
islated against. It is the duty of the courts under those circumstances to say that
however broad the language of a statute may be, the act although within the letter
is not within the Intention of the legislature, and therefore cannot be within the stat-
ute.
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conditions we are led to inquire whether the anti-religionist and
non-religionist have been discriminated against by our laws as they
now stand and are enforced. We have already seen that some anti-
religious practices, such as blasphemy, have been prohibited, but
they were not prohibited because they were anti-religious as dis-
tinguished from religious, but were prohibited along with objec-
tionable religious acts and practices because they interfered with
the public health, safety and morals. The West Virginia Consti-
tution provides that, "Property used for educational, literary,
scientific, religious or charitable purposes" may be exempted from
taxation.72 Thus property used for religious purposes is placed
within the same category as property used for educational, literary,
scientific or charitable purposes. The theory on which such prop-
erty as the above named is exempted from taxation is that by com-
mon consent it is regarded as being used to encourage and carry
out worthy enterprises beneficial to all. The anti-religionist or
non-religionist might fail to recognize that property used for reli-
gious purposes comes within this category.
However that may be, our state legislature has seen fit to act
in pursuance of this constitutional provision and has exempted
property used for religious purposes from taxation.7 3  This is a
case where the atheist and the religionist are not made equal before
our law. This is witnessed by the fact that by the exemption of
church property the atheist is indirectly compelled to aid and
support an enterprise from which theoretically he derives no bene-
fit, and in which he does not believe. Our constitutional provision
as to this matter and the legislation made in pursuance of it is
defensible on grounds of practicability. Since as a practical matter
the overwhelming majority of the citizens of this State are adher-
ents of or are in sympathy with some religious belief, it is proper
that religion generally should be encouraged, even though it does
inconvenience a few.
After an investigation of the possibilities under our constitu-
tional provisions and the legislation made in pursuance thereof,
we conclude that, while it may have been the intention of the fram-
ers of our constitutions to guarantee religious freedom in the broad
sense, the language used is not sufficiently comprehensive to pre-
clude the possibility of judicial construction which would uphold
the constitutionality of legislation based on the assumption that our
See W. VA. CONBT=0TUON, Art X, §1.
S1ARNEE' W. VA. CoDE, 1923, §57 of Ch. 29. See also in this connection, state v.
KMttle, et al, 87 W. Va. 526, 105 S. E. 776.
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constitutional guaranties of religious freedom presupposes the
adherence of all men to some religious belief.
In conclusion, we submit that the status of religious freedom
in West Virginia is as follows: Using the term in the narrow
sense so as to comprehend merely freedom for religionists we have
absolute freedom in so far as religion is a condition of the mind and
is purely matter of opinion, but in so far as it involves the perform-
ance of acts it is limited and restricted to the extent that the indi-
vidual must conform to the rules for civil conduct prescribed by
law, even though underlying those rules may be a code of morality
which is the product of a religious doctrine to which he does not
subscribe. But, using the term in the broad sense, so as to include
freedom for non-religionists and anti-religionists, we neither have
an absolute constitutional guaranty of religious freedom, since
we have seen that the whole guaranty in so far as it relates atheists
may be vitiated by judicial construction, nor as a matter of prac-
tice do we have religious freedom, since all our citizens are not
equally protected by our laws irrespective of their religious belief
or lack of religious belief.
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